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Why do many homeowners purchase insurance only after experiencing a loss
from a rare and extreme event, like an earthquake or a large hurricane?
Why do insurance companies classify certain types of
risk as uninsurable? And why do insurance regulators
prohibit insurers from setting premiums that reflect
risk, particularly in locales that repeatedly suffer losses
from natural disasters?1
The short answer is that insurance today is misunderstood and hence is not effectively meeting its most
important objectives—to inform those at risk about
the hazards they face, to reduce damage from future
disasters and to provide claims payments to policyholders who suffer losses. More specifically, insurers
and their regulators are not providing transparent
information to people residing in hazard-prone areas
as to the nature of the risks they face, and consumers are not adequately incentivized to undertake loss
reduction measures prior to a disaster. As a result, U.S.
taxpayers have been on the hook for large losses from
extreme events over the last few decades. The 2005
and 2012 hurricane seasons alone cost taxpayers nearly
$150 billion.
The evidence on the increased losses from natural
catastrophes and more extreme weather trends suggests that the worst is yet to come. As of the end of
2012, there was $35 trillion of insured exposure in
the coastal states from Texas to Maine. If appropriate
mitigation measures are not adopted, future hurri-

SUMMARY
• Consumers tend to purchase too little insurance or purchase it
too late. Consequently, taxpayers wind up bearing substantial
burdens for paying reconstruction costs from extreme events.
The 2005 and 2012 hurricane seasons alone cost taxpayers
nearly $150 billion.
• There is much that can be done to better facilitate the role
that insurance can play in addressing losses from extreme
events, both natural and man-made.
• To better meet its objectives, insurance must implement two
guiding principles. First, premiums should accurately reflect risk.
But if this principle is put into effect, individuals in hazard-prone
areas will face large, unexpected price increases, necessitating
the second guiding principle: to ensure equity and affordability,
special financial assistance should be made available to the
homeowners who would no longer be able to afford their
premiums.
• Other policy tools that can help reduce losses from extreme
events include: choice architecture that will encourage individuals
to purchase and maintain insurance; public-private partnerships
to provide private insurers with federal reinsurance in the case
of truly catastrophic disasters and to make low-interest loans
and grants more available to property owners; and multi-year
insurance policies tied to risk-prone properties.
• Collectively, these measures would lead to less property damage, lower costs to homeowners, more secure mortgages,
and lower costs to the government and taxpayers for disaster
assistance.
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canes and floods are likely to replace
Katrina and Sandy in the rankings of
the most costly insured losses in the
coming years.
In the United States, there is
much that can be done to better facilitate the role that insurance can play in
addressing these issues in the face of
extreme events, both natural and manmade. In particular, short-term incentives and policy options are needed
to improve the decision-making of
consumers, insurance companies, and
insurance regulators.
To be effective, insurance requires
accurate risk assessment for setting
premiums that reflect the likelihood
and consequences of damage. Moreover, insurers should conduct regular
inspections to ensure that property
meets existing building codes; they
can then offer premium discounts for
those who undertake loss reduction
measures. This is the way that factory
mutuals operated when they were
founded in the mid-1800s. Firms were
given an insurance policy only after
they were inspected and shown to be
safe. Insurance premiums reflected the
best estimates of the risk; improvements were rewarded with lower
premiums reflecting the expected
reduction in future claims. Firms that
did not continue to keep their factories

TABLE 1: FIFTEEN MOST COSTLY INSURED CATASTROPHES (1970-2015)
$ Billion

Event

Victims

Year

Area of Primary Damage

78
41

Hurricane Katrina; floods

1,836

2005

USA, Gulf of Mexico

9/11 Attacks

3,025

2001

USA

37

Earthquake (M 9.0) and tsunami

35

Hurricane Sandy; floods

19,135

2011

Japan

237

2012

USA

26
22

Hurricane Andrew

43

1992

USA, Bahamas

Northridge Earthquake (M 6.6)

61

1994

USA

22
16

Hurricane Ike; floods

136

2008

USA, Caribbean

Hurricane Ivan

124

2004

USA, Caribbean

15

Floods; heavy monsoon rains

815

2011

Thailand

15

Earthquake (M 6.3); aftershocks

181

2011

New Zealand

15

Hurricane Wilma; floods

35

2005

USA, Gulf of Mexico

12

Hurricand Rita

34

2005

USA, Gulf of Mexico, et al.

11

Drought in the Corn Belt

123

2012

USA

10

Hurricane Charley

24

2004

USA, Caribbean, et al.

10

Typhoon Mireille

51

1991

Japan

operating safely were warned that their
insurance policy would be canceled
unless they took corrective action.2
Choice architecture, public-private
partnerships, and multi-year insurance policies all have a role to play
here. At the same time, appropriate
financial assistance programs must be
developed for those whose risk-based
premiums are so high that they cannot
afford coverage.

INTUITIVE AND
DELIBERATIVE THINKING
Decision-makers normally deal with
risk by combining intuitive thinking
with deliberative thinking. Intuitive
thinking operates automatically and
quickly, with little or no effort and no
voluntary control. It is often guided
by emotional reactions or simple rules
of conduct that have been acquired by
personal experience with events and
their consequences. Deliberative think-

NOTES
This issue brief is based on Kunreuther, H. (2015). The Role
of insurance in reducing losses from extreme events: The
need for public-private partnerships, Geneva Papers on Risk
and Insurance, 1018-5895/15, Vol. 40, pp. 741-762.
2 Bainbridge, J. (1952). Biography of an Idea: The Story
of Mutual Fire and Casualty Insurance, Garden City, NY:
Doubleday; Kunreuther, H. and Roth, R., Sr, (eds.) (1998)
Paying the Price: The Status and Role of Insurance against
Natural Disasters in the United States. Washington, D.C.:
Joseph Henry Press.
1

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
4 Botzen et al. show that only 20% of those who suffered
damage from Hurricane Sandy had purchased flood insurance before the storm occurred. Botzen, W., Kunreuther, H.
and Michel-Kerjan, E. (2015). Divergence between individual
perceptions and objective indicators of tail risks: Evidence
from floodplain residents in New York City. Judgment and
Decision Making 10(4): 365-385.
5 Michel-Kerjan, E., Lemoyne de Forges, S. and Kunreuther,
3

2

H. (2012). Policy tenure under the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Risk Analysis 32(4): 644–658.
6 Premiums are higher after a disaster because insurers seek
to recoup losses by raising rates.
7 Cummins, D.J. and Lewis, C.M. (2003). Catastrophic
events, parameter uncertainty and the breakdown of implicit
long-term contracting in the insurance market: The case of
terrorism insurance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26(2/3):
153–178.
8 For more details on a proposed voucher program based on
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ing allocates attention to effortful and
intentional mental activities where
individuals undertake trade-offs
implicit in benefit-cost analysis, and
recognize relevant interdependencies and connectedness as well as the
need for coordination in coping with
extreme events.
Behavioral decision research and
cognitive psychology teach us that
intuitive thinking, guided heavily by
emotions and focused on short time
horizons and goals, is a common
human response for dealing with lowprobability, high-consequence events,
oftentimes at the expense of adopting
cost-effective deliberative strategies
for mitigating future catastrophes.3
Consumers who engage in intuitive thinking often fail to purchase
insurance, or buy it only after suffering losses from a disaster. Insurers who engage in intuitive thinking
sometimes proclaim that a risk is
uninsurable even when the data exists
to assess the risk (as in the case of
earthquake insurance), or when the
risk is insurable only with the help of
a federal backstop against large losses
(as in the case of terrorism insurance).
Regulators sometimes prevent insurers
from charging premiums that reflect
risk, which may suggest to those residing in hazard-prone areas that they are

safe from disasters when, in fact, they
are not.
These conditions often lead the
federal government to allocate large
sums of disaster relief that result in
taxpayers bearing substantial burdens
for paying reconstruction costs from
extreme events.
The history of flood insurance
highlights the challenges we face
today in encouraging property owners
to invest in loss reduction measures.
Following the Mississippi Flood of
1927, private insurers ceased offering flood coverage because they felt
the risk was uninsurable due to the
possibility of highly-correlated large
losses. In the wake of Hurricane
Betsy in 1965, the federal government
established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968. Since
the inception of the NFIP, the federal
government has been heavily subsidizing flood insurance premiums for
existing homes in flood-prone areas
so that insurance would be affordable
and to protect property values. However, when premiums are subsidized
there is no incentive for homeowners
to undertake loss reduction measures,
or for the federal government to provide discounts for those who invest in
loss reduction measures.
Even though homeowners in

hazard-prone areas are required to
purchase flood insurance as a condition for a federally insured mortgage,
many homeowners do not purchase
this coverage until after they suffer
a loss.4 A large percentage of these
homeowners later drop their coverage if they do not make a claim over
the next few years. An analysis of the
NFIP portfolio found that just 73%
of the 841,000 new flood insurance
policies purchased in 2001 were
still in force one year later. The rate
dropped to 49% after two years and
only 20% after eight years.5 This
behavior of ignoring potential disasters and overreacting to recent ones
by purchasing policies when premiums are at their highest seems contradictory, but in fact it stems from
the same source: a lack of information
and incentives.6
The problem, in large part, lies in
the widely held view that insurance
is an investment from which individuals expect a return in the form of
claims payments following a disaster.
In reality, insurance is a protective
measure should one suffer a loss.
Homeowners should celebrate not
having a loss because the financial
consequences for an uninsured individual could be staggering. One open
question is how to communicate to

For more information, see http://shoreupct.org/
For more details on the renewal of TRIA, see: Kunreuther,
H., Michel-Kerjan, E., Lewis, C., Muir-Wood, R. and Woo, G.
(2014). TRIA after 2014. Wharton Risk Management Center,
University of Pennsylvania.
14 Kunreuther, H. and Michel-Kerjan, E. (2015). Demand for
fixed-price multi-year contracts: Experimental evidence from
insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 51(2):
171-194.
15 Well-enforced building codes in Chile led to the relatively low

death toll from the 8.8 magnitude earthquake that shook
the country in 2010. See: Useem, M., Kunreuther, H. and
Michel-Kerjan, E. (2015) Leadership Dispatches: Chile’s Extraordinary Comeback from Disaster. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
16 Lewis, C. and Murdock, L. (1996). The role of government
contracts in discretionary reinsurance markets for natural
disasters. Journal of Risk and Insurance 63(4): 567–597.
17 Repetto, R. and Easton, R. (2012). Climate change and damage from extreme weather events. Environment 52(2): 22–33.

NOTES
empirical data, see: Kousky, C. and Kunreuther, H. (2014).
Addressing affordability in the national flood insurance
program. Journal of Extreme Events 1(1): 1–28.
9 Thaler, R. and Sunstein, C. (2008). Nudge: The Gentle Power
of Choice Architecture, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
10 Weinstein, N.D., Kolb, K. and Goldstein, B.D. (1996). Using
time intervals between expected events to communicate risk
magnitudes. Risk Analysis 16(3): 305–308.
11 Thaler and Sunstein (2008).
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people that the best return on an insurance policy is no return at all.
Homeowners are not the only
stakeholders to exhibit systematic
biases and utilize simplified decision
rules. Consider insurance and reinsurance companies in the presence of
ambiguous risk. Most insurers instinctively stopped underwriting policies
to cover losses from terrorist attacks
after 9/11 because reinsurers refused
to protect them against losses from
another attack.7 Protection against
terrorism was never explicitly priced in
or excluded from commercial policies
prior to that event, despite numerous
attacks in the preceding decade. However, terrorism was deemed an uninsurable risk almost overnight, largely
because there was no rule of thumb to
instruct actuaries and underwriters on
how to assess the likelihood or magnitude of the risk.
Regulators are also susceptible to
intuitive thinking errors that can lead
to inefficient outcomes. For example,
state insurance regulators occasionally
restrict insurers from setting premiums that reflect risk in an attempt
to guarantee equity and fairness for
homeowners, regardless of their varying levels of risk.

TWO GUIDING PRINCIPLES
OF INSURANCE
Insurance fails to meet its objectives
when it does not heed what should
be its two guiding principles. As
discussed in a previous Penn Wharton Public Policy Issue Brief (Vol.1
No. 9), the first principle states that
premiums should reflect risk as a means
of signaling to individuals how safe or
exposed they are, as well as the extent

to which preventive or protective
measures will reduce their vulnerability to losses and hence their premiums. If this principle is applied in
hazard-prone areas where premiums
are currently subsidized, some residents will face large, unexpected price
increases, which leads to the second
guiding principle.
If premiums should reflect risk,
then equity and affordability need to
be considered. Special financial assistance should be made available to
the homeowners currently residing
in hazard-prone areas who would no
longer be able to afford their premiums. The assistance could come from
means-tested vouchers8 or through
other means such as tax credits or tax
rebates. It should not be in the form
of a subsidized insurance premium.
This principle applies only to individuals with limited means who
currently reside in hazard-prone areas.
Those who choose to move to these
areas would be charged premiums that
reflect their true risk.
Risk-based insurance pricing
opens the door for significant premium reduction potential if homeowners take steps to mitigate their
property risks. Elevating a home
within a floodplain, for example,
could lead to greatly reduced insurance premiums, but such an investment is costly. To facilitate the process
of mitigating one’s home, vouchers or
tax credits could be coupled with lowcost, long-term loans to spread the
cost of mitigation over the life of
the mortgage.

POLICY TOOLS TO IMPROVE
DELIBERATIVE RISK
MANAGEMENT POLICY
Beyond the two guiding principles of
insurance, understanding decisionmaking under risk and uncertainty
also is essential for insurers, regulators, and policymakers. The following
list of policy tools provides structure
for applying the guiding principles to
reduce losses from extreme events in
the long run.
1. CHOICE ARCHITECTURE
Decisions often depend on how
options are presented and how probabilities are framed.9 For example,
consumers better grasp the likelihood
of suffering losses from an extreme
event if the odds are given over a
longer timeline. Homeowners are
more likely to pay attention to their
flood risk if they are told that they
have a greater than 1-in-5 chance
of experiencing at least one severe
flood in the next 25 years rather than
indicating to them that there is a
1-in-100 probability of a severe flood
next year.10
Making insurance purchase the
default option may also lead to better
coverage for homeowners, as many
experiments show that individuals
tend to stick with pre-selected choices
instead of opting out and seeking
alternative options in situations with
outcomes that are certain or where
the default option carries the highest
expected benefit.11 This tool has not
yet been tested on purchasing and
maintaining catastrophe insurance.
2. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

There is a role for government to play
in helping incentivize stakeholders.
4
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For example, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) can assist individuals who cannot otherwise afford to
invest in protective measures because
of high upfront costs. Homeowners’
resistance to undertaking mitigating
action increases if they plan to move
in the next few years because of their
fear that the property value of their
house will not reflect the expected
benefits of their flood- or wind-proofing investments.
PPPs make mitigation measures
accessible and affordable through low
interest loans and grants that are currently offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
to property owners in hazard-prone
areas. In July 2014, Connecticut
initiated its Shore Up CT program
designed to help residential and business property-owners elevate buildings, retrofit properties with additional flood protection, or assist with
wind-proofing structures on property
that is prone to coastal flooding. This
state program, the first in the United
States, enables homeowners to obtain
a 15-year loan ranging from $10,000
to $300,000 at an annual interest rate
of 2-3/4 (two and three-quarters)
percent.12
An innovation would be to market
disaster insurance and the mitigation
loan as a package tied to the property.
This program would address both the
mitigation and affordability issues
simultaneously. Homeowners who
invest in cost-effective loss-reduction
measures would be given a premium
discount to reflect the reduction in
expected losses from disasters, which
would more than pay for the cost of
their home improvement loans. Net
financial benefits from undertaking

the mitigation measure would then be
obvious to the homeowner.
On the supply side, private insurers would be more willing to provide
coverage against extreme events if the
public sector covered part of the losses
should the disaster be catastrophic.
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
(TRIA), passed after the 9/11 attacks,
is a federal backstop for private insurers that limits catastrophic losses for
insurance companies. American taxpayers will not be responsible for any
payments until the total commercial
losses from a terrorist attack exceed
$60 billion. In return for the federal
reinsurance, insurers are required to
make terrorism insurance available
to all their commercial clients, even
though firms are under no obligation
to buy this insurance.13
Insurers’ withdrawal from certain
markets led to the establishment of
government-backed programs such as
the California Earthquake Authority and the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP).
3. MULTI-YEAR INSURANCE POLICIES
A useful complement to incentivizing
property improvement is a multiyear insurance (MYI) policy tied to
the property. Insurers could consider
designing three-to-five-year policies, to dissuade policyholders from
canceling their policies if they did not
suffer losses for several years. Property owners would benefit from stable
annual premiums and would incur a
penalty should they cancel their policy
unless they sold their house during
this period. MYI policies would also
motivate insurers to inspect properties over time to ensure building code
compliance—something they would
5

not do with annual contracts—and
would decrease their marketing costs.
Empirical evidence from a controlled
experiment indicates that buyers
prefer a two-year insurance contract
to one-year contracts even with higher
annual premiums. And just introducing the two-year option into the
menu of choices increases aggregate
consumer demand for disaster insurance.14 However, MYI policies are
non-starters for insurers without their
ability to charge risk-based premiums.
4. ADDITIONAL POLICY TOOLS
Other policy options for overcoming
the challenges inherent in the intuitive thinking of consumers, insurers,
and regulators include:
• Requiring homeowners in hazardprone areas to carry coverage for
catastrophic risk.
• Holding builders and original
owners accountable for all disasterrelated damage in the event of
building violations. Chile does this,
and the accountability period lasts
up to a decade.15
• Providing seals of approval certifying that a property owner has taken
steps toward mitigating disaster risk.
These would be signals to potential
buyers and would help to ensure
that property values adequately
reflect risk reduction investments.
• Auctioning (at the federal level) a
limited number of annual catastrophe reinsurance contracts to private
insurers, extending backstop protection for risks other than terrorism.16
The social welfare benefits of these
strategies and policy tools are
numerous. Collectively, they would lead
to less damage to property, lower costs
to insurers for protecting against cata-
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strophic losses, more secure mortgages,
and lower costs to the government and
taxpayers for disaster assistance.

DATA NEEDED
In order to determine the price of
risk-based premiums and affordability, there is need for more accurate
data, a principal reason that FEMA
is now updating their flood risk maps.
Anonymized census data on household income and other factors such
as percentage of income spent on
mortgage would help to inform criteria for determining circumstances and
methods on how financial assistance
could be provided to address affordability issues.
One risk in particular that federal
agencies and other organizations have
greatly underestimated is climate
change and sea level rise. Forecasting
the potential damage from climate

change and sea level rise and preparing policy responses to extreme
weather events require that risk
management stakeholders more fully
address assessment, mitigation, and
affordability concerns sooner rather
than later.17

CONCLUSION
The United States must capitalize
on the concerns raised by Hurricane
Sandy and the discussions for the
renewal of the NFIP in 2017. The
NFIP is $27 billion in debt to the
U.S. Treasury in the aftermath of
hurricanes over the last decade, and
the most accurate scientific models
suggest that we are going to face even
more extreme weather in the
coming years. If premiums reflecting
risk based on accurate, data-driven
risk assessment can be augmented
by public-private partnerships that

6

support mitigation loans, grants, and
means-tested vouchers to ensure
affordability, insurance in the United
States could begin to reach its potential. Reducing the need for taxpayer
money for future disaster relief should
be a top priority for policymakers.
For risk-based insurance to be part
of such a strategy, there is a need for
support from key interested parties.
These include real estate agents, developers, banks and financial institutions,
and residents in hazard-prone areas,
as well as public sector organizations
at the local, state and federal levels.
Insights from behavioral science,
innovations from the insurance industry, and other policy tools can then aid
in directing consumers, insurers, and
regulators towards this vision of strategic disaster-risk management policy.
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